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1. Introduction 
This thesis includes four essays on the management of wild Atlantic salmon (Salmo salar). 
The main focus is on the management of the recreational fishery; thus, the focus is on salmon 
in the rivers, where anglers buy fishing permits from landowners in order to fish for salmon. 
However, because there are many important events influencing salmon in the marine 
environment, marine fishing of salmon and aquaculture are also included exogenously in the 
models. The issues considered range from pure bioeconomic modelling of management 
regimes, bioeconomic modelling of invasive species interacting with native species, game 
theory aspects regarding side payments from riparian to marine right holders, and more 
specific analyses of components in the demand function for angling experiences. The first 
three chapters contain theoretical bioeconomic modelling illustrated by numerical 
simulations. The final chapter is mainly empirical reporting results from a contingent 
valuation survey that was a part of the project. 
 
2. Summary of the essays 
Chapter 1: The Bioeconomics of a Wild Atlantic Salmon (salmo salar) Recreational Fishery 
In this chapter, the baseline biomass model of a wild salmon (Salmo salar) river recreational 
fishery is formulated. The aim of this essay is to analyse how biological and economic factors 
affect harvest rates, stock growth, the economic benefits, and the distribution of economic 
benefits among anglers and landowners in a representative Norwegian Salmon river. In line 
with today’s stylized management practice in Norway, it is assumed that the suppliers of 
fishing permits do not take into account the fact that this year’s fishing effort influences next 
year’s stock size. Hence, they act as myopic agents. We study both price-taking and 
monopolistic supply and these myopic schemes are contrasted with the social planner 
solution. Gear regulations in the recreational fishery, but also in the commercial fishery, are 
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analysed under the three management scenarios. Both the steady states and the dynamic paths 
are examined. It turns out that it is generally unclear how the various harvesting schemes 
distribute total surplus between anglers and landowners. This hinges critically on the 
uncertain stock and effort effects under the different management scenarios. One novel result 
is that imposing gear restrictions in the recreational fishery may have the exact opposite stock 
effects of imposing restrictions on the marine harvest. 
 
It has traditionally been argued that the recreational fishery is of minor importance to the wild 
Atlantic salmon stock abundance because the escapement needed to ensure recruitment is 
quite low. Thus, NASCO (2001) regards low marine survival as the crucial factor determining 
the decreasing wild stock. This chapter offers an alternative explanation as we show that, even 
with a constant marine survival, large stock fluctuations may be due to type of river 
management. The analysis also provides some policy implications as we demonstrate that an 
increased marine harvesting activity may in fact be stock conserving under myopic 
management. Moreover, measures taken to reduce the marine harvesting activity may produce 
unclear stock effects as well as large stock fluctuations. The crucial factor here is how strong 
the demand quality effect is. We show that this hinges critically on type of management 
scheme in the river, and in the myopic case we find that a reduced marine harvest rate may go 
hand in hand with a reduced stock. Imposing gear restrictions in the river generally increases 
the stock and decreases total surplus, but may also lead to reduced stock fluctuations over 
time. 
 
Chapter 2: Playing Chicken with Salmon 
In this chapter, we analyse the case where wild Atlantic salmon stock is harvested by both 
recreational anglers and commercial fishermen. Many studies have argued that the share of 
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the total harvest caught in the recreational sector should typically increase because the value 
of the fish in this sector is greater than that in commercial fisheries (for example, see Cook 
and McGaw 1996, Laukkanen 2001, and Olaussen and Skonhoft 2005). This is also the case 
for Atlantic salmon, where the return from sport fishing in rivers is several times higher than 
marine ‘for meat only’ harvests. However, when at least one party has property rights, agents 
left to their own devices should be able to allocate resources according to the well-known 
‘Coase Theorem’. Hence, this situation calls for a side payment regime where river owners 
pay marine fishermen not to fish, and where both parties gain. It is argued that the reason why 
such side payment regimes are rarely seen, despite the obvious mutual gain, is due to the 
potential free-riding incentives among river owners. Although it is shown that the decision 
each river owner faces can be described as a game of chicken, taking the stochastic ecology 
into account may reveal a different pay-off structure.  
 
The game played between the river owners is a side payment game (acquisition of marine 
fishing rights). We use equilibrium levels in mixed strategies as indicators of the likelihood 
that each manager cooperates (acquisition of marine fishing rights) or defects (no acquisition). 
The influence of stochastic survival of recruits on the mixed strategy equilibrium levels is 
analysed under two different price setting regimes in the rivers: rigid and flexible fishing 
permit prices. Rigid permit prices are in accordance with present price setting in most salmon 
rivers because the permit prices are announced in the winter, long before the stock is observed 
(in summer) and the fishing season opens. Since this rigid price setting lacks motivation in 
any formal requirements, but rather seems to reflect some traditional practice, we want to 
analyse an alternative price setting regime that takes the stochastic ecology of salmon into 
account. Flexible permit prices mean that the permit price is set at the beginning of the fishing 
season, after the stock size can be determined. We demonstrate that when ecology is 
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stochastic, rigid and flexible prices may shift the equilibrium mixed strategy levels in opposite 
directions. The reason why rigidities may strengthen the incentives of river owners to free ride 
is as follows. With rigid prices and stochastic survival, the owners earn less when survival is 
high, and may even face potential losses when survival is low.  
 
Chapter 3: On the Economics of Biological Invasion: An Application to Recreational Fishing 
In this chapter, we analyze the influence escaped farmed species may have on the natural 
habitants. More specifically, we study the effects that escaped farmed salmon (EFS) may have 
on wild Atlantic salmon. The invaders can be viewed as biological pollution, and in that 
sense, the paper is essentially an extension of McConnell and Strand (1989). They analysed 
the social returns to commercial fisheries when water quality influenced both demand and 
supply of commercial fish products under both open access and when fish stocks were 
efficiently allocated. The invasion case considered here requires additional demand and 
supply effects to be considered. 
 
The paper demonstrates four general mechanisms that may affect economically valuable 
species when exposed to biological invasion. We distinguish between an ecological level 
effect and an ecological growth effect. The ecological level effect is due to the fact that EFS 
adds to the wild stock and hence increases the upstream migration in the rivers. The 
ecological growth effect reflects the fact that the growth of the wild population is affected by 
e.g. crossbreeding with the escaped farmed salmon. In addition we present an economic 
quantity effect working through demand. This is the economic analogue to the ecological level 
effect as the yearly inflow of EFS ceteris paribus increases the catches in the rivers. Finally 
we suggest that there is an economic quality effect that reflects the possibility that invasions 
affect the harvesting agents directly through demand-side forces. For example, this may occur 
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because the state of the original species or the ecosystem is altered. We depart from the 
existing literature by revealing ecological and economic forces that explain why different 
agents may lack incentives to control invasions.  
 
Our results indicate that, even if the growth rate of the wild species is reduced, the total stock 
may increase when there is an ecological invasion. Hence, measures to reduce an invasion 
may very well reduce the overall river surplus because less biomass will be available to catch. 
One interesting result is that, if there is no economic quality effect, the harvesting effort will 
be higher due to the economic quantity effect and, hence, the stock will be less than before the 
invasion. In this case, the river profit and the angler surplus will always be higher ex post the 
invasion, and both will increase with invasion of the farmed species. Thus, one consequence 
that follows directly from the analyses is that reporting the share of invasive species in an 
ecosystem may reduce the demand for harvesting the wild species. This will in turn increase 
the wild stock and depending on the composition of the catch, the share of resident species in 
the ecosystem may increase.  
 
The mechanisms discussed in the essay may also be transferable to other situations where 
escaped farmed animals mix with their wild congeners, or where an ecosystem faces a yearly 
influx of invasive species for any reason. For example, there is an apparent analogue to 
agricultural invaders that is grown commercially but escapes to interbreed with wild plants. 
We demonstrate that the overall surplus may rise following an invasion. Of course, this may 
have important implications for incentives to reduce the accidental releases of farmed species. 
As shown, participants in the harvest may want invasions to persist. Perhaps more 
importantly, these economic forces, or lack of incentives, may explain why policymakers 
must intervene if they want to reduce invasions.  
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Chapter 4: Bandwagon or snob anglers: Evidence from a recreational fishery.  
This chapter analyses the effect of congestion on the demand for wild Atlantic salmon 
recreational fishing in Norway. Both social interaction and crowding are usually reported to 
be important determinants of recreational outdoor activities. As they are both determined by 
the total number of simultaneous participants in the recreational activity, the effect of 
increasing the number of participants are generally ambiguous. An analogue to Leibenstein´s 
(1950) bandwagon and snob effect in demand is presented, and these theoretical models are 
extended to allow for different congestion effects at different congestion levels. Empirical 
evidence from a CV study on Norwegian recreational Atlantic salmon fishing demonstrate 
that the crowding effect dominates the social interaction effect for all levels of congestion. 
Moreover, we show that the marginal crowding effect is diminishing in the congestion level, 
as opposed to Schuhmann and Schwabe (2004) that finds an increasing marginal effect of 
congestion on recreational angling demand. On the other hand, the diminishing marginal 
utility from congestion with respect to beach use in McConnel (1977) is supported by our 
result for angling. In line with the literature on heterogeneous preferences for congestion (see 
e.g. McConnell 1988 and Schumann and Schwabe (2004)), we try to identify different user 
(angler) groups. However, we find no socioeconomic or other differences between the “snob” 
and “bandwagon” anglers in the sample.  
 
From a management point of view, crowding in popular recreational activities may reduce the 
overall welfare, and therefore needs to be addressed. Evidence of the impacts of congestion is 
important to resource managers because congestion can be an effective way of rationing the 
usage. To understand the relationship between congestion and sociability is of equal 
importance, and the relationship may obviously differ for different recreational activities. 
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From a river manager point of view, this may obviously be important information when 
deciding how to manage the fishery.  
 
3. Discussion 
Modelling is about making simplifying assumptions without losing the essence of the real-life 
situation that we want to say something about. What to include and what to leave out is not an 
exact science. In a good model, the general driving forces revealed will survive when the 
model is extended to include more components from real life. To what extent the papers 
presented in the following chapters fulfil these requirements is up to future research to reveal. 
However, I feel the most important aspects omitted deserve some thoughts and remarks. 
 
As already mentioned, more complete models would require the marine harvest decision 
(especially in chapter 2) and the aquaculture production decision (in chapter 4) to be 
endogenously modelled. However, given the focus on river management and incentives facing 
river managers, the decision to limit the models with respect to these aspects seems natural. 
Another increasing and important aspect omitted is the possibility of catch-and-release 
fishing. There are two main reasons for this. First, catch-and-release fishing is analysed 
thoroughly in a bioeconomic model by Anderson (1993). Second, so far, catch-and-release 
fishing of Norwegian Atlantic salmon is very rare. 
 
Although many management regimes are considered in chapters 2, 3 and 4, these must be 
considered as stylized extremes. As mentioned in the chapters, most real-life situations are 
somewhere between these extremes. For example, a type of monopolistic competition may 
very well occur since there are always at least some differences between different pools in a 
river. However, as some rivers are more likely to be characterized as price-taking than 
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monopolistic rivers, and vice versa, analysing the extremes provides information that may be 
more-or-less in accordance with the actual situation in various rivers. 
 
Also, the demand side is obviously simplified in the thesis, as explained in chapter 2. In the 
baseline model presented there, only stock size and aggregate demand affect the willingness 
to pay (wtp) for fishing permits. Other things that may influence demand such as 
accommodation, situation, nice surroundings, average size of the fish (which varies between 
rivers), stability of water flow during season, sociability, number of permits sold per day and 
so forth, are neglected in the bioeconomic models presented. However, the demand side is 
extended in one aspect in chapter 4 where the pureness of the salmon, in terms of the 
percentage of escaped farmed salmon in the river, is taken into account. Moreover, chapter 5 
focuses more explicitly on the demand side and the relationship between sociability and 
congestion in recreational fishing. 
 
Finally, the instantaneous Schaefer-type harvest function applied in the thesis needs to be 
mentioned. As the recreational fishery normally lasts for three months during the summer, the 
instantaneous harvest function may seem inappropriate. However, it turns out that it is more 
suitable than one would imagine. The reason is as follows: salmon reach their specific home 
river continuously during the whole fishing season. Some start their upstream migration at the 
beginning of June, some in July and others in late August. Some salmon even arrive before 
June and some after the fishing season closes at the end of August. It turns out that the good 
time to catch a salmon is when they arrive and during their upstream migration; these are the 
so-called newly arrived fish. When salmon are no longer newly arrived, they are much harder 
to catch (Fiske and Aas 2001). Hence, fish that arrived in June and were not caught in June 
are much less likely to be caught in July or August. This means that the instantaneous harvest 
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function seems to be a reasonably appropriate representation of the actual harvest process in 
the rivers, after all. 
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